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Note 
 
Economic Protectionism and Occupational 
Licensing Reform 
Gerald S. Kerska* 
Consider the case of Tasos Kariofyllis and Steve Barraco—
two entrepreneurs who started a successful teeth whitening 
business in Connecticut.1 The company, aptly named Sensa-
tional Smiles, sold over-the-counter whitening products in a 
mall. Sensational Smiles had comfortable seating for custom-
ers, and its employees helped purchasers enhance their new 
whitening products through the application of LED lights.2 
Both the products sold and the services provided were safe.3 
The Connecticut State Board of Dental Examiners, composed of 
practicing dentists and therefore the direct competitors of busi-
nesses like Sensational Smiles, decided that teeth whitening is 
a form of dentistry.4 The Board sent Kariofyllis and Barraco a 
cease and desist letter.5 Unwilling to risk criminal prosecution 
or to attend dental school, the entrepreneurs closed Sensational 
Smiles.6 Kariofyllis and Barraco brought suit in federal court, 
alleging a deprivation of their due process rights to engage in a 
 
*  J.D. Candidate 2017, University of Minnesota Law School. Thank you 
to Professors Dale Carpenter and Heidi Kitrosser for their guidance in writing 
this Note. Many thanks to the Minnesota Law Review members who suffered 
through the editing process. Any remaining errors are undoubtedly my own. 
Copyright © 2017 by Gerald S. Kerska. 
 1. Connecticut Teeth Whitening, INST. FOR JUST., http://ij.org/case/ct 
-teeth-whitening (last visited Mar. 17, 2017). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. (“There is no health or safety reason to make it illegal for anyone 
other than a dentist to offer teeth-whitening services.”). 
 4. See CONN. STATE DENTAL COMM’N, DECLARATORY RULING: TEETH 
WHITENING (2011), http://www.ct.gov/dph/lib/dph/phho/dental_commission/ 
declaratory_rulings/2011_teeth_whitening_declaratory_ruling_-_corrected.pdf. 
 5. Connecticut Teeth Whitening, supra note 1. 
 6. Id. 
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lawful profession and a denial of equal protection under the 
law.7 To what result? 
Under the Supreme Court’s post-Lochner economic liber-
ties cases, almost-certain victory awaited the government.8 In-
deed, the Court said as much in Ferguson v. Skrupa, noting 
that “relief, if any be needed, lies not with us but with the body 
constituted to pass laws for the [state].”9 The district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Connecticut,10 and the 
Second Circuit affirmed on appeal.11 Although Sensational 
Smiles lost their suit, litigants across the country have per-
suaded federal district courts to strike down a number of occu-
pational licensing laws,12 and these surprising cases have led to 
a circuit split.13 
The disagreement between the circuits centers on the type 
of interests that may justify government action, like occupa-
 
 7. Martinez v. Mullen, 11 F. Supp. 3d 149, 152 (D. Conn. 2014), aff’d sub 
nom. Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1160 (2016). 
 8. For many years, Lochner served as popinjay for critics of the “activist” 
Supreme Court in the early twentieth century. See, e.g., Paul E. McGreal, 
Alaska Equal Protection: Constitutional Law or Common Law?, 15 ALASKA L. 
REV. 209, 280 n.169 (1998) (“The ghost of Lochner has haunted the Court ever 
since, with justices invoking the case to accuse their opponents of unjustified 
judicial activism.”). The Court at that time protected economic liberties by 
applying rather searching scrutiny to laws interfering with the now-disfavored 
freedom of contract. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), abrogated 
by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (holding a law limiting 
work hours to be unconstitutional restriction on the right to freedom of con-
tract). But Lochner is not without its defenders. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, 
Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental 
Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1 (2003) (suggesting that the academy 
should reassess Lochner-style jurisprudence). 
 9. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963). 
 10. Martinez, 11 F. Supp. 3d at 170 (granting Connecticut’s motion for 
summary judgment). 
 11. Sensational Smiles, 793 F.3d at 283 (affirming on appeal). 
 12. See, e.g., Brantley v. Kuntz, 98 F. Supp. 3d 884 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (in-
validating a requirement that African hair braiders become licensed cosmetol-
ogists); Waugh v. Nev. State Bd. of Cosmetology, 36 F. Supp. 3d 991, 997 (D. 
Nev. 2014) (striking down a requirement for those who teach makeup artistry 
to be cosmetologists); Bruner v. Zawacki, 997 F. Supp. 2d 691, 693 (E.D. Ky. 
2014) (striking down a competitor’s veto law for moving trucks); Clayton v. 
Steinagel, 885 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1213 (D. Utah 2012) (invalidating another 
African hair-braiding statute); Cornwell v. Hamilton, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1101 
(S.D. Cal. 1999) (same). 
 13. See infra Part I.C (discussing the current circuit split on the validity 
of economic protectionism as a legitimate government interest). 
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tional licensing laws. In these cases, states have defended oc-
cupational licensing laws by arguing that such regulations may 
be justified out of pure economic protectionism—i.e., favoring 
one set of favored constituents over others, even if the public 
does not benefit from the law. 
The Second and Tenth Circuits have explicitly held that 
laws may be passed out of economic protectionism, while the 
Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth disagree.14 Not only did those three cir-
cuits reject economic protectionism as a basis for government 
action, they also struck down occupational licensing laws under 
the rational basis standard.15 This result is surprising consider-
ing that the Supreme Court abandoned economic substantive 
due process in 1937 and has not since invalidated a single piece 
of economic legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment.16 
This raises a series of interesting questions. Does Supreme 
Court precedent justify striking down laws after a showing of 
economic protectionism? And if not, should courts extend 
heightened scrutiny to occupational licensing laws motivated 
by such a purpose? 
This Note seeks to answer those questions. Part I introduc-
es background materials on occupational licensing, equal pro-
tection and due process jurisprudence, and the circuit split over 
economic protectionism. Part II of this Note breaks with a 
growing body of scholarship by arguing that even if the econom-
ic protectionism principle is constitutionally illegitimate, Su-
preme Court precedent does not support the invalidation of li-
censing statutes. Part III argues that heightened judicial scru-
tiny should not be extended to create a strong anti-economic 
protectionism principle for three reasons. First, courts lack the 
institutional capacity to determine when a licensing law exhib-
its this illegitimate motive. Second, an aggressive anti-
economic protectionism principle would call into question much 
state and federal legislation, leaving courts with the heady task 
of rooting out special interest influence. Third, by denying liti-
gants relief under the Fourteenth Amendment, courts promote 
efficiency by routing challenges into other legal areas—namely 
 
 14. See infra Part I.C. 
 15. See infra note 24 and accompanying text (collecting studies which 
show that occupational licensing laws provide little in the way of consumer 
benefits). 
 16. See Michael J. Phillips, Another Look at Economic Substantive Due 
Process, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 265, 266 (stating that the Supreme Court aban-
doned economic substantive due process in 1937). 
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state constitutional and administrative law and federal anti-
trust law. Finally, Part IV contends that Congress is the ap-
propriate branch of government to remedy restrictive licensing 
laws and sets forth a grant program that could supply this 
remedy. 
I.  ECONOMIC CHALLENGES UNDER THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT AND ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM   
This Part begins by laying groundwork for a discussion of 
the role an anti-economic protectionism principle would play 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Section A provides context about occupational licensing 
laws and the trouble they cause the American economy. Section 
B supplies the Fourteenth Amendment principles that would 
govern a challenge to an occupational licensing law. Finally, 
the last Section introduces the circuit split over economic pro-
tectionism in the federal courts of appeal. Together, these three 
Sections will provide the context for evaluating whether Su-
preme Court precedent justifies striking down occupational li-
censing laws that are motivated by economic protectionism. 
A. OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING 
An occupational license is a government-issued credential 
that enables a person to engage in a profession.17 In theory, fed-
eral, state, and local governments use this regulatory tool to 
protect consumers.18 To be sure, many occupational licenses do 
protect the public. Consider, for instance, the licensing re-
quirements imposed on doctors and airline pilots. But the bene-
fits of many licensing laws are not so clear. Why should hair 
shampooers, interior decorators, and horse teeth floaters need 
permission from the government to earn a living?19 
 
 17. DEP’T OF TREASURY, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
POLICYMAKERS 6 (2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/ 
files/docs/licensing_report_final_nonembargo.pdf [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE 
REPORT]. 
 18. Id. at 3. 
 19. See, e.g., Locke v. Shore, 634 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2011) (upholding an 
onerous requirement on interior designers); Shampoo Technician, TENN. DEP’T 
COM. & INS., https://www.tn.gov/commerce/article/cosmo-shampoo-technician 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2017) (requiring anyone who “brushes, combs, shampoos, 
rinses and conditions upon the hair and scalp” to undertake “not less than 300 
hours in the practice and theory of shampooing at a school of cosmetology”); 
Texas Equine Dentistry, INST. FOR JUST., http://ij.org/case/mitz-v-texas-state 
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Occupational licensing is prevalent across the country. 
Over the past half-century, the percentage of professions li-
censed in the United States increased sharply from about five 
percent in the 1950s to around thirty percent today.20 This rise 
is at least partially explained by an increasingly service-
oriented American economy and an American workforce belong-
ing to fewer labor unions.21 Without question, licensure is good 
for those in the licensed profession, “rais[ing] their wages by as 
much as 15 percent and enhanc[ing] other benefits such as 
health coverage and pensions.”22 That said, overly restrictive 
licensing laws are not good for the economy. 
A recent study—endorsed by the Obama Administration—
concluded that over-licensure adds nearly three million people 
to the unemployment rolls, while costing American consumers 
about $300 billion per year in excess prices.23 But there is little 
evidence to suggest that consumers receive anything in re-
turn.24 Economists refer to this type of situation as rent-
seeking, a practice by which a group of professionals join to-
gether to lobby legislators to raise their occupation’s entry re-
quirements.25 Heightened barriers to entry restrict competition, 
which allows professionals to raise their rates, free from the 
inconveniences of an open market.26 
To make matters worse, the negative effects of occupation-
al licensing often form an insurmountable hurdle for entrepre-
neurs and for disadvantaged workers. As many as thirty-five 
percent of military spouses practice licensed professions, which 
 
-board-of-veterinary-medical-examiners (last visited Mar. 17, 2017) (describing 
the practice of horse tooth floating, which involves the filing of horse teeth). 
 20. Douglas Clement, The Rise of Occupational Licensing, FED. RES. BANK 
MINNEAPOLIS (June 1, 2008), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/the 
-region/the-rise-of-occupational-licensing. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Morris M. Kleiner, Reforming Occupational Licensing Policies 6 
(Brookings Inst.: Hamilton Project, Discussion Paper 2015-01, 2015), https:// 
www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/THP_KleinerDiscPaper_ 
final.pdf. 
 23. Morris M. Kleiner, Occupational Licensing: Protecting the Public In-
terest or Protectionism? 3 (Upjohn Inst. Emp. Res., Policy Paper No. 2011-009, 
2011), http://research.upjohn.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context= 
up_policypapers. 
 24. See WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 58 (collecting studies). 
 25. See Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 
64 STAN. L. REV. 191, 194 (2012) (discussing “the costs of lobbyist-driven rent-
seeking on the national economy”). 
 26. See WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 14. 
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means they need additional training or to pay additional fees 
every time their family moves across state lines.27 Immigrants 
also struggle to meet the licensing requirements for jobs for 
which they are otherwise qualified.28 Furthermore, in many 
states, a person with a past criminal conviction may be denied 
a license.29 There may also be some evidence that occupational 
licensing laws disproportionately harm minority workers.30 It is 
then no surprise that states with the most onerous licensing 
laws have significantly lower rates of entrepreneurship by low-
income citizens.31 
B. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO LEGISLATION 
The Supreme Court uses a tiered framework for evaluating 
challenges brought under the Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.32 Courts apply 
heightened scrutiny to laws impinging on a fundamental right 
or drawing a classification that includes a suspect group.33 
Fundamental rights include marital privacy, parental child-
rearing decisions, a woman’s right to an abortion, and mar-
riage.34 Suspect classifications are most commonly thought of as 
 
 27. Id. at 4. 
 28. Id. at 5. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Timothy Sandefur, Can You Get There from Here?: How the Law 
Still Threatens King’s Dream, 22 LAW & INEQ. 1, 6–16 (2004) (detailing how 
occupational licensing laws hurt minority communities). 
 31. STEPHEN SLIVINSKI, BOOTSTRAPS TANGLED IN RED TAPE: HOW STATE 
OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING HINDERS LOW-INCOME ENTREPRENEURSHIP 6 tbl.4 
(2015). 
 32. The multi-tiered framework is often attributed to the most famous 
footnote in all of constitutional law, footnote four of United States v. Carolene 
Products. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also Susannah W. Pollvogt, Beyond 
Suspect Classifications, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 739, 751 (2014) (“Rather than 
being based in Brown or any of the seminal race cases, the most prominent 
doctrinal features of contemporary equal protection jurisprudence—suspect 
classification analysis and the tiers of scrutiny—trace their intellectual herit-
age back to a law-clerk-drafted footnote in a six-page decision about filled 
milk.”). 
 33. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (rational basis scrutiny 
applies when “a classification neither involv[es] fundamental rights nor pro-
ceed[s] along suspect lines”). 
 34. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (defining a fun-
damental right to marital privacy); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925) (defining a fundamental right of parents to make child-reading deci-
sions); Myers v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (same). 
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those involving race and gender.35 When heightened scrutiny 
applies, it often results in courts striking down state action.36 
All other challenges, including those to occupational licensing 
laws, receive rational basis scrutiny, which almost always re-
sults in a victory for the government.37 
Rational basis review is not demanding. The Supreme 
Court describes it as a “paradigm of judicial restraint.”38 In re-
viewing legislation under this standard, a court first asks 
whether the government is pursuing a permissible objective, 
then whether the governmental action bears any rational rela-
tionship to achieving that objective.39 At both steps of the in-
quiry, the challenged action comes cloaked in a strong pre-
sumption of constitutionality. 
Unlike the federal government, which has only enumerat-
ed powers, state governments possess the general police power, 
permitting them to act in the promotion of public health, safety, 
or welfare.40 Courts do not inquire into the motivation behind a 
particular action, and nearly any piece of legislation can be de-
scribed as benefitting the public in some way.41 As a result, it is 
the rare case where improper purpose leads to invalidation.42 
 
 35. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) 
(listing race, alienage, national origin, and sex as classes receiving heightened 
scrutiny). 
 36. Professor Gerald Gunther famously referred to strict scrutiny as 
“‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.” Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of 
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protec-
tion, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). But see Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and 
Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 
59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 796 (2006) (“Thirty percent of all applications of strict 
scrutiny—nearly one in three—result in the challenged law being upheld.”). 
 37. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (“In the area of eco-
nomics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause 
merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classi-
fication has some ‘reasonable basis,’ it does not offend the Constitution simply 
because the classification ‘is not made with mathematical nicety or because in 
practice it results in some inequality.’” (quoting Lindsley v. Nat. Carbonic Gas 
Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911))). 
 38. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993). 
 39. See, e.g., Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“First, are 
they directed at the achievement of a legitimate governmental purpose? Se-
cond, do they rationally further that purpose?”). 
 40. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 314. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See id.; cf. Clark Neily, One Test, Two Standards: The On-and-Off 
Role of “Plausibility” in Rational Basis Review, 4 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199, 
208 (2006) (“[T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly held the legislature’s actual 
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The rational connection between the challenged action and 
real or hypothesized governmental objective is easy to satisfy. 
The government need not prove that the legislation actually 
works, and the government’s decision is not “subject to court-
room factfinding and may be based on rational speculation un-
supported by evidence or empirical data.”43 Nor must the gov-
ernment solve an entire problem at once. Under rational basis 
review, partial solutions suffice and legislatures may leave the 
rest of the issue for another day.44 
It is nearly impossible for litigants to prevail under the 
traditional rational basis standard. To do so, one must show 
that every possible justification for the challenged action fails.45 
And if proving a negative is not hard enough, courts help the 
government by proposing reasons for upholding challenged ac-
tions.46 
The Supreme Court’s rational basis jurisprudence is not 
always so deferential. On four occasions, the Court has invali-
dated laws motivated by “a bare congressional desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group” under the rational basis stand-
ard.47 Scholars call this more demanding form of review “ra-
tional basis with bite.”48 Although a majority of the Supreme 
Court has never formally recognized that such a second ration-
al basis standard exists, individual Justices and commentators 
have done so repeatedly.49 Because economic protectionism 
 
intent in passing the challenged law is irrelevant under the rational basis 
test.”). 
 43. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 315. 
 44. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 485–87 
(1955). 
 45. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (stating that a litigant 
must negate every possible justification for the legislation). 
 46. See Aaron Belzer, Putting the “Review” Back in Rational Basis Review, 
41 W. ST. U. L. REV. 339, 339 (2014) (describing the use of hypothetical justifi-
cations to survive judicial review). 
 47. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973); see also Unit-
ed States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 582–84 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 
620, 633 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 435 
(1985). 
 48. See, e.g., Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any 
Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 780 (1987) (referring to this more aggressive 
form of review as “rational basis with bite”). 
 49. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 
759–63 (2011) (describing the rational basis with bite doctrine). 
  
2017] ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM 1711 
 
might be a form of impermissible animus, a brief but deeper 
dive into these cases is necessary. 
Rational basis with bite first appeared in 1973 with the 
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno.50 There the 
Court struck down food stamp requirements because legislative 
history revealed that animus against hippies motivated the 
law.51 Twelve years later, the Court invalidated a zoning ordi-
nance after determining that a city denied a permit to a home 
for cognitively disabled persons out of irrational prejudice.52 
Next, rational basis with bite continued to appear in a trilogy of 
gay rights decisions. First, in Romer v. Evans, the Court struck 
down a Colorado constitutional amendment that stripped legal 
protections from homosexuals.53 Second, Justice O’Connor 
wrote separately in Lawrence v. Texas, arguing that an anti-
sodomy law was invalid under the Equal Protection Clause be-
cause it exhibited animus.54 Finally, the Court in United States 
v. Windsor relied on rational basis with bite to invalidate the 
Defense of Marriage Act.55 
These five cases provide the best evidence that a rational 
basis with bite standard exists. In each, the government should 
have prevailed, but ultimately failed to do so under rational 
basis review.56 Whether it was saving financial resources by 
increasing restrictions on the availability of food stamps in 
Moreno or keeping a home for the disabled off of a flood plain in 
Cleburne, each case presented a possible—albeit flimsy—
justification for the challenged law.57 If such a standard of re-
view exists, then how does it work? 
In the few cases thus far, triggering the rational basis with 
bite standard requires a showing that government officials act-
 
 50. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534–35 (stating that animus “against hippies 
cannot, in and of itself and without reference to [some independent] considera-
tions in the public interest, justify” the law (alteration in original) (quoting 
Moreno v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 314 n.11 (D.D.C. 1972))). 
 51. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534. 
 52. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 435. 
 53. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996). 
 54. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring). 
 55. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013). 
 56. Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from Animus, 
2013 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 192 (2014) (describing the rationales that could have 
justified the challenged laws). 
 57. Id. at 207. 
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ed out of animus or a “bare . . . desire to harm.”58 This type of 
purpose scrutiny is common in Fourteenth Amendment juris-
prudence.59 Indeed, facially neutral laws are subject to strict or 
intermediate scrutiny only after a showing that state actors 
targeted a suspect group.60 In Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., the Court laid out 
factors for determining legislative motive: whether a law has a 
disparate impact on a class of persons, whether the government 
departed from its normal procedural processes or substantive 
considerations, the legislative or administrative history, and 
“[t]he historical background of the decision . . . particularly if it 
reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purpos-
es.”61 These factors all relate to the process through which legis-
lators pass laws, making them the best indicia of legislative 
intent. The Supreme Court, in turn, used these factors to de-
termine whether government action was motivated by ani-
mus.62 
Although the Supreme Court has firmly established that 
laws cannot be motivated by animus, the Court has not clearly 
defined exactly how the rational basis with bite standard ap-
plies. The cases thus far indicate that after a litigant shows an-
imus to have been the primary motivation of state action, 
heightened judicial scrutiny will apply but the precise nature of 
that scrutiny remains undefined. The Court in Cleburne sug-
gested, in dicta, that the government might still prevail after a 
showing of animus, but that flimsy or hypothetical justifica-
tions are no longer sufficient.63 Instead, courts should search for 
the actual reasons that motivated the challenged state action 
 
 58. Yoshino, supra note 49, at 760. 
 59. See generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional 
Analysis, 85 CAL. L. REV. 297 (1997) (discussing the Supreme Court’s purpose 
scrutiny in constitutional law cases). 
 60. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (“[T]he basic equal pro-
tection principle that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially dis-
criminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.”). 
 61. 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977). See generally Robert C. Farrell, Legislative 
Purpose and Equal Protection’s Rationality Review, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1992) 
(compiling the methods used by the Supreme Court to analyze legislative pur-
pose). Statutory statements of purpose have also been used to determine legis-
lative purpose. Cf. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 465 
(1981) (examining the articulated statutory purposes). 
 62. See Carpenter, supra note 56, at 246–48 (describing the Supreme 
Court’s animus methodology). 
 63. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985). 
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and determine if they are legitimate.64 In other words, the cloak 
of presumed constitutionality is removed. The government 
must show that the law rationally serves a legitimate, non-
animus-based objective. Whether these same principles apply 
to laws motivated by economic protectionism is a question for a 
later Section. 
C. CIRCUIT COURTS DISAGREE OVER WHETHER ECONOMIC 
PROTECTIONISM SERVES A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT INTEREST 
Recall that when courts examine state action under the ra-
tional basis standard, they ask whether the action serves a val-
id government purpose. A question divides the courts of appeal: 
is economic protectionism—that is, favoring one group of citi-
zens against competition—such a valid purpose? Two circuits 
have held economic protectionism is legitimate; three others 
disagree. 
The Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits all hold economic pro-
tectionism to be an illegitimate interest. In the first of those 
decisions, the Sixth Circuit struck down a licensing statute that 
limited casket sales to funeral home directors.65 In reaching 
that conclusion, the court cited cases involving the Contracts 
and Dormant Commerce Clauses, stating “[c]ourts have repeat-
edly recognized that protecting a discrete interest group from 
economic competition is not a legitimate governmental pur-
pose.”66 Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that providing a 
benefit to special interests is not a valid exercise of the police 
power.67 The term “police power” refers to the authority of a 
state to enact legislation.68 Later the Fifth and Ninth Circuits 
would cite this line of reasoning with approval.69 All three of 
these decisions are similar in one other way: after rejecting 
 
 64. See Farrell, supra note 61, at 24–25 (referring to Cleburne and Moreno 
as searching for the government’s “actual purpose”). 
 65. See Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 66. Id. at 224. 
 67. Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 
412 (1983). 
 68. For an early Supreme Court discussion of the police power, see New 
Orleans Gas-Light Co. v. Louisiana Light & Heat Producing & Manufacturing. 
Co., 115 U.S. 650, 660 (1885). 
 69. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 700 F.3d 154, 161 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Nota-
bly, we approve[ ] of the Craigmiles court’s reasoning . . . .”); Merrifield v. 
Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 991 n.15 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e agree with the Sixth 
Circuit in Craigmiles and reject the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning . . . .”). 
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economic protectionism as a legitimate government interest, 
they all struck down regulations under the “traditional rational 
basis review.”70 
On the other side of the ledger, both the Tenth and Second 
Circuits have held that economic protectionism is a legitimate 
state interest.71 In Powers v. Harris, the Tenth Circuit began by 
distinguishing the cases cited by the Sixth Circuit.72 The court 
noted that different state interests may survive judicial review 
depending on the clause of the Constitution at issue.73 Thus, 
while economic protectionism may not pass muster under the 
dormant Commerce Clause, it might do so under the Equal 
Protection Clause. To support this conclusion, the court cited a 
whole string of Fourteenth Amendment cases—including those 
involving occupational licensing—where the Supreme Court 
upheld protectionist regulations based on the recognition of re-
liance interests or simply to “[free a] profession, to as great an 
extent as possible, from all taints of commercialism.”74 In Sen-
sational Smiles v. Mullen, the Second Circuit agreed that eco-
nomic protectionism is a legitimate interest.75 Striking down 
regulations motivated by rent-seeking, according to the court, 
would be “destructive to federalism and to the power of the sov-
ereign states to regulate their internal economic affairs.”76 After 
accepting economic protectionism as a legitimate interest, both 
of these courts went on to uphold the challenged regulations 
under the rational basis standard.77 
 
 70. St. Joseph, 712 F.3d at 227; Merrifield, 547 F.3d at 992; Craigmiles, 
312 F.3d at 229. 
 71. Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1160 (2016); Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 
2004). 
 72. Powers, 379 F.3d 1219–21. 
 73. Id. at 1220. 
 74. Id. at 1221 (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 
483, 491 (1955)); see also Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 
103 (2003); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Ferguson v. 
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). 
 75. Sensational Smiles, 793 F.3d at 286 (“We join the Tenth Circuit and 
conclude that economic favoritism is rational for purposes of our review of 
state action under the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 76. Id. at 287. 
 77. Id. at 288; Powers, 379 F.3d at 1225. 
  
2017] ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM 1715 
 
II.  WHY EXISTING SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT IS 
INADEQUATE FOR REMEDYING LICENSING LAWS 
MOTIVATED BY ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM   
As the last Part discussed, the courts of appeal are divided 
on whether economic protectionism is a legitimate government 
interest. Several circuits, rejecting such an interest, have 
struck down occupational licensing regulations under the tradi-
tional rational basis standard.78 A large body of scholarship al-
ready asks whether economic protectionism is a legitimate gov-
ernment interest.79 Stepping back from the legitimacy question, 
assume instead that economic protectionism is an illegitimate 
government interest and may not serve as a justification for 
state action. This nevertheless leaves open a question: How can 
or should courts enforce an anti-economic protectionism princi-
ple? The answer to this question largely determines whether 
the Equal Protection Clause serves as a proper vehicle for oc-
cupational licensing reform. 
This Part assumes that economic protectionism cannot jus-
tify state action and proceeds by examining two possible roles 
that an anti-economic protectionism principle could play in 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. A weak version of such 
a principle would consist of applying rational basis review, 
while rejecting any attempt by state actors to justify their 
choices out of protectionism. In other words, passing rational 
basis muster requires that a law serve some non-protectionist 
justification. A strong principle, however, would treat economic 
protectionism as a constitutionally forbidden motivation, much 
like animus, and would trigger rational basis with bite. 
This Part analyzes these possibilities under Supreme 
Court precedent. Ultimately, the weak version is irrelevant; 
rational basis review is so deferential that any occupational 
 
 78. See St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 223–28 (5th Cir. 2013); 
Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 990–92 (9th Cir. 2008); Craigmiles v. 
Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 225–29 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 79. For commentators arguing in favor of increased judicial scrutiny of 
occupational licenses, see, for example, Lana Harfoush, Grave Consequences 
for Economic Liberty: The Funeral Industry’s Protectionist Occupational Li-
censing Scheme, the Circuit Split, and Why It Matters, 5 J. BUS. ENTREPRE-
NEURSHIP & L. 135 (2011) (arguing against protectionist occupational licens-
ing); Steven Menashi & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Rational Basis with Economic 
Bite, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1055, 1085–96 (2014); Timothy Sandefur, The 
Right To Earn a Living, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 207 (2003) (arguing for heightened 
protection of economic liberties). 
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licensing law should pass muster. Yet the strong version, treat-
ing economic protectionism like animus, is not supported by the 
principles underlying rational basis with bite. As a result, an 
anti-economic protectionism principle should not, under cur-
rent Fourteenth Amendment precedent, provide a basis for 
striking down overly restrictive licensing regimes. 
A. ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM AS AN ILLEGITIMATE END UNDER 
TRADITIONAL RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW 
An anti-economic protectionism principle could serve a 
weak role in constitutional jurisprudence where courts continue 
to apply rational basis review to licensing challenges but do not 
allow state actors to justify legislation with respect to that in-
terest. In essence, courts would demand that state actors pro-
vide a legitimate public health, safety, or welfare goal for chal-
lenged action.80 This weak version of the principle is what the 
Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits purported to use in striking 
down occupational licensing laws.81 The problem with this ap-
proach lies with the rational basis standard itself.82 
Taking protectionism off the table does little for those 
harmed by occupational licensing because the government will 
prevail if it can come up with any justification for its actions—
real or hypothetical.83 Making matters worse, there are several 
hypothetical rationales that will always apply to licensing laws. 
Many forms of onerous occupational licensing may be justi-
fied as a recognition of reliance interests. The Supreme Court 
has twice blessed this line of reasoning. In City of New Orleans 
v. Dukes, the Court found the recognition of established push 
cart vendors’ contributions to the French Quarter sufficient to 
 
 80. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. 
 81. This is precisely what the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits claimed to 
do. See St. Joseph, 712 F.3d at 227 (claiming to apply rational basis review 
and expressly denying that the court was reviving Lochner); Merrifield, 547 
F.3d at 992 (claiming to apply rational basis review in striking down a statu-
tory scheme that exempted some pest control operators from licensing but not 
others); Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 228 (claiming to apply rational basis review 
and expressly denying that the court was reviving Lochner). 
 82. Critics of deferential rational basis review mock the standard by refer-
ring to it as the “rationalize-a-basis-test.” See, e.g., Timothy Sandefur, Ration-
al Basis Scrutiny Is Just a Stupid Rock, CATO UNBOUND (Feb. 18, 2014), 
http://www.cato-unbound.org/2014/02/18/timothy-sandefur/rational-basis 
-scrutiny-just-stupid-rock (crediting Clark Neily with coining the phrase). 
 83. See sources cited supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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uphold a grandfather clause.84 The Court applied the same rea-
soning in Fitzgerald v. Racing Association of Central Iowa by 
upholding a steep tax differential between slot machines on 
riverboats and at racetracks because the boats were heavily 
invested in the Mississippi communities.85 
This same line of reasoning can be applied to occupational 
licensing laws. The protection of reliance interests rationale 
commonly arises when an existing profession seeks to expand 
the scope of activities covered under its definition.86 For exam-
ple, dentists may wish to define teeth whitening as dentistry,87 
doctors may seek to constrict the procedures conducted by 
nurse practitioners,88 and cosmetologists may wish to stop unli-
censed hair braiders.89 At first blush, it might seem preposter-
ous to require teeth whiteners to be dentists. But as Judge 
Calabresi recently noted, there are several ways in which these 
regulations meet the minimal rationality standard.90 Increasing 
the cost of one type of service, say teeth whitening, might sub-
sidize the cost of other dental procedures.91 But at a more basic 
level, if a legislature wants citizens to undergo arduous train-
ing for a profession—assuming that the licensure of that under-
lying profession is rational—then any expansion of the profes-
 
 84. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 305 (1976) (explaining 
that “newer businesses were less likely to have built up substantial reliance 
interests” and that the older businesses “had themselves become part of the 
distinctive character and charm that distinguishes the Vieux Carre”). 
 85. 539 U.S. 103, 109 (2003) (“[L]egislators may have wanted to encourage 
the economic development of river communities or to promote riverboat histo-
ry, say, by providing incentives for riverboats to remain in the State . . . .”). 
 86. Many of the successful challenges described in the Introduction arise 
when one profession (usually cosmetologists) lobby legislators to impose new 
or additional licensing requirements on their hair-braiding competitors. See 
cases cited supra note 12. 
 87. See, e.g., Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281, 283–85 (2d 
Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1160 (2016) (describing how a state dental 
board changed the definition of dentistry). 
 88. See generally Benjamin J. McMichael, Occupational Licensing and 
Legal Liability: The Effect of Regulation and Litigation on Nurse Practitioners, 
Physician Assistants, and the Healthcare System (May 2015) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University), https://law.vanderbilt.edu/phd/ 
students/files/McMichael.pdf (describing how lobbying efforts by doctors affect 
the range of activities that nurse practitioners may undertake). 
 89. See cases cited supra note 12. 
 90. Sensational Smiles, 793 F.3d at 287–88. 
 91. Id. 
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sion’s scope should also be rational.92 Forcing a discrete group 
of citizens to bear the brunt of subsidizing a profession may be 
unjust, but the Supreme Court has found it to be permissible.93 
There are several other broad rationales, aside from recog-
nizing reliance interests, that will almost always provide a jus-
tification for occupational licensing laws. First, state boards of 
examiners supervise many licensed occupations.94 Often these 
boards investigate consumer complaints and may levy discipli-
nary sanctions.95 In this way licensing laws may provide some 
degree of consumer protection.96 Second, states may try to com-
bat potential problems created by asymmetrical information in 
the marketplace.97 With some professions, consumers may lack 
sufficient information about the quality of a firm’s services, 
which creates the possibility that unrestrained competition 
may lead to a race to the bottom.98 Finally, a state might be-
lieve that the training required for licensure provides value to 
consumers, even if it is not strictly necessary. For example, the 
Supreme Court upheld a regulation that required adjusters to 
hold law degrees because customers might have legal ques-
tions.99 The Court even declined to confront the appellee’s ar-
gument that debt adjusting requires no legal knowledge.100 Just 
 
 92. This follows as a matter of basic logic. If, as is commonly accepted, 
barriers to entry raise salaries, then restrictive licensing laws act as a form of 
subsidy for the licensed profession. See supra Part I.A (describing the econom-
ic effects of licensing laws). 
 93. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732–33 (1963) (upholding a 
statute requiring debt collectors to be lawyers even though debt collection re-
quires no legal training). 
 94. See WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 45. 
 95. See, e.g., NAM D. PHAM & ANIL SARDA, THE VALUE OF COSMETOLOGY 
LICENSING TO THE HEALTH, SAFETY, AND ECONOMY OF AMERICA 12 (2015), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/52850a5ce4b068394a270176/t/54ca482ee
4b04bc79092e6da/1422542894461/PBA+Report+-+February+2015.pdf. 
 96. But see St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 225–27 (5th Cir. 
2013) (rejecting the consumer protection argument); WHITE HOUSE REPORT, 
supra note 17, at 58 (collecting studies showing that licensure has limited ef-
fects on quality). 
 97. See CAROLYN COX & SUSAN FOSTER, COSTS AND BENEFITS OF OCCU-
PATIONAL REGULATION 5–8 (1990), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ 
documents/reports/costs-benefits-occupational-regulation/cox_foster_-_ 
occupational_licensing.pdf (describing the asymmetry problem). 
 98. Id. at 6 (suggesting that firms may let the quality of their services 
deteriorate if consumers lack the ability to discern quality). 
 99. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732–33 (1963). 
 100. Id. The Court was aware of this argument because the appellee made 
it in his brief. See Brief for Appellee at 14, Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 
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as the Court posited a hypothetical benefit to legal knowledge 
in the debt adjuster case, so also can courts find hypothetical 
value in the education requirements imposed by many licensing 
laws.101 And if that is true, then such licensing laws must pass 
rational basis muster. 
In conclusion, a weak anti-economic protectionism princi-
ple, if widely adopted, would not serve as vehicle for occupa-
tional licensing reform. Laws survive rational basis review 
whenever a court can find that such law serves any public 
health, safety, or welfare rationale.102 With most licensing laws, 
this low standard will be met easily. In other cases, this Section 
shows that judges have a whole menu of fallback options, in-
cluding recognizing reliance interests, added value, or consum-
er protection—none of which are subject courtroom fact-
finding.103 This means that for an anti-economic protectionism 
principle to have teeth, it must trigger rational basis with bite. 
B. A STRONG ANTI-ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM PRINCIPLE: 
APPLYING RATIONAL BASIS WITH BITE 
A strong anti-economic protectionism principle would work 
similarly to the Supreme Court’s rational basis with bite cases. 
In fact, one might think of economic protectionism as “economic 
animus.”104 To recap, the Supreme Court’s rational basis with 
bite standard involves two steps. First the Court applies the 
factors from Arlington Heights to determine whether (econom-
ic) animus was the primary motivation for the challenged legis-
lation. Second, the Court removes the cloak of presumed consti-
tutionality that normally accompanies rational basis challenges 
and instead searches for a legitimate purpose for the law.105 
 
(1963) (No. 111), 1963 WL 106151 at *14 (arguing that the practice of law is 
unrelated to debt collection). 
 101. For example, a hair braider who attends cosmetology school may have 
increased knowledge of sanitation procedures. 
 102. See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text. 
 103. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (stating that 
there is no courtroom fact-finding of legislative purpose).  
 104. To the author’s knowledge, Judge O’Scannlain of the Ninth Circuit 
was the first judge to use this phrase as a substitute for economic protection-
ism. See Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 989 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 105. See Carpenter, supra note 56, at 246–48 (describing the Supreme 
Court’s animus methodology). 
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Thus far, the Court has not upheld any challenges at the se-
cond step.106 
This Section argues that the Supreme Court cases estab-
lishing rational basis with bite review for laws motivated by 
animus do not justify applying that same standard to those mo-
tivated by economic protectionism. In short, traditional animus 
cases bear two characteristics that justify heightened review: 
the targeting of a distinct and disfavored social group and a 
break down in the democratic process.107 Because laws motivat-
ed by economic protectionism, like occupational licensing, do 
not bear those same traits, heightened judicial scrutiny is not 
justified under Supreme Court precedent. 
1. Lack of Present or Historical Societal Antipathy and 
Economic Protectionism as Business as Usual 
The Supreme Court’s rational basis with bite cases involve 
the invalidation of legislation motivated by a bare desire to 
harm a politically unpopular minority. The idea that govern-
ment may not single out a disfavored group for unequal treat-
ment traces its origins to the anti-caste beginnings of the Four-
teenth Amendment.108 The Equal Protection Clause commands 
that state actors must treat each citizen with equal regard.109 
And if “equal protection of the laws means anything, it must at 
the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate gov-
ernmental interest.”110 Although the Supreme Court has not 
been clear about when or why rational basis with bite review 
applies, two principles are present in each case. 
First, each of the cases involved discrete social groups that 
suffered from present or historical social disapproval. Although 
 
 106. See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text. 
 107. See discussion infra Parts II.B.1, II.B.2. 
 108. See Carpenter, supra note 56, at 229–32; see also Susannah W. 
Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887 (2012) (discuss-
ing the Supreme Court’s animus cases and caste-based legislation). For a 
thorough treatment of the history of the Equal Protection Clause’s anti-caste 
origins, see Steven G. Calabresi & Hannah M. Begley, Originalism and Same-
Sex Marriage, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 648 (2016) (concluding that an original 
understanding of the anti-caste mandate of the Equal Protection Clause justi-
fies the invalidation of same-sex marriage bans). 
 109. See Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 456 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The Equal 
Protection Clause does, however, require the state to treat each person with 
equal regard, as having equal worth, regardless of his or her status.”). 
 110. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). 
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none of the rational basis with bite cases involve formally rec-
ognized suspect classifications, all four of the injured plaintiffs 
were members of groups suffering from longstanding or exist-
ing social stigma. In Moreno, for instance, the congressional 
record explicitly stated that keeping “hippies or hippy com-
munes” off of food stamps was an aim of the legislation.111 The 
facts of Cleburne, Romer, and Windsor drive this point home. 
Society long stigmatized both homosexuals and cognitively dis-
abled persons.112 Even though the Court did not explicitly rely 
on quasi-suspect group status as an explicit factor for trigger-
ing rational basis with bite, each case nevertheless involved 
such a group. 
Second, the rational basis with bite cases involved judicial 
prevention of state actors turning disfavored social group 
membership—i.e., cognitive disability, homosexuality, member 
of a hippy community—into “systemic social disadvantage.”113 
Each case involved an attempt to systematically disadvantage 
those groups. Moreno involved a denial of food stamps benefits 
to hippies in need.114 Cleburne concerned the denial of a zoning 
permit that would not have impeded others.115 Romer and 
Windsor restored legal benefits and protections to homosexu-
als.116 These cases show that once the government decides to 
provide legal protections or benefits, it cannot deny them to 
groups of disfavored citizens purely out of dislike.117 
Economic protectionism, if treated as a form of unconstitu-
tional animus, would depart from both these principles. With 
some exceptions, occupational licensing laws do not target any 
 
 111. Id. at 543. 
 112. See Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 314–15 (D. 
Conn. 2012) (providing a thorough analysis of materials supporting the 
longstanding societal discrimination against homosexuals); Samuel R. 
Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 419–
25 (2000) (summarizing the findings of fact contained within the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, which detail longstanding societal prejudices against the 
cognitively disabled). 
 113. See supra notes 50–56 and accompanying text (discussing the Su-
preme Court animus cases). 
 114. See cases cited supra note 47. 
 115. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985). 
 116. See supra notes 53, 55–56. 
 117. Cf. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 800 (1997) (“Generally speaking, laws 
that apply evenhandedly to all ‘unquestionably comply’ with the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.” (quoting N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 
(1979))). 
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particular group.118 To be sure, the effects of licensing re-
strictions often fall most heavily on low-income entrepre-
neurs.119 Yet in no way do these individuals form a distinct so-
cial group. The Supreme Court once described wealth discrimi-
nation as involving “a large, diverse, and amorphous class . . . 
[bearing] none of the traditional indicia of suspectness.”120 
Licensing laws also differ from traditional rational basis 
with bite cases because they are evenhanded regulations. Any-
one may join a profession, provided that they fulfill the re-
quirements.121 More crucially, each of the rational basis with 
bite cases involved the denial of a government benefit or legal 
protection that the state actor provided broadly—i.e., food 
stamps, municipal zoning rules, discrimination protections, 
recognition of state marriages for federal benefits.122 In con-
trast, states do not provide occupational licenses as a matter of 
entitlement; they set out generally applicable requirements for 
entering a profession. And a lack of unequal treatment weighs 
against applying rational basis with bite to evenhanded but 
unjust occupational licensing laws.123 
2. Laws Passed out of Economic Protectionism Are Subject to 
Political Correction in Ways Laws Passed out of Animus Are 
Not. 
Licensing laws motivated by economic protectionism are 
subject to democratic reform in ways that laws motivated by 
animus are not.124 At the outset, it is worth noting that occupa-
 
 118. So far no court dealing with an occupational licensing challenge has 
entertained the possibility that licensing laws “target” any particular, identifi-
able group. See cases cited supra note 12. 
 119. See generally DICK M. CARPENTER II ET AL., LICENSE TO WORK: A NA-
TIONAL STUDY OF BURDENS FROM OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING (2012), https:// 
www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/economic_liberty/occupational_licensing/ 
licensetowork.pdf (studying common occupational licensing laws that affect 
low-income workers). 
 120. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
 121. Again, licensing challenges do not rely on claims that state officials 
are treating prospective professionals unequally. See supra note 12 (collecting 
cases). 
 122. See supra notes 47–58 and accompanying text (describing the rational 
basis with bite cases). 
 123. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 800 (1997); see also Pers. Adm’r of 
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271–72 (1979) (“Most laws classify, and many 
affect certain groups unevenly, even though the law itself treats them no dif-
ferently from all other members of the class described by the law.”). 
 124. The Carolene Products framework relies in part on the assumption 
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tional licensing laws are difficult to reform through the political 
process.125 The analysis in this Subsection is comparative and 
seeks to establish that laws motivated by economic protection-
ism are more likely to be reformed politically than those laws 
passed out of animus, making judicial intervention in the eco-
nomic sphere less justified. 
The primary distinction between laws passed out of eco-
nomic protectionism and those passed out of animus is the par-
ty bearing the costs of state action. In the rational basis with 
bite cases, the group suffering from government mistreatment 
internalized the effects of mistreatment. Whether it was going 
without food stamps or being denied anti-discrimination protec-
tions, the plaintiffs in those cases bore the brunt of the harm. 
The same is not true of licensing laws motivated by protection-
ism. 
Excessive licensing regimes function differently. Just like 
the animus cases, the parties injured by economic protection-
ism who cannot practice their profession are most acutely in-
jured. Unlike the animus cases, however, excessive barriers to 
entry create artificially inflated prices, and those dead-weight 
losses are passed on to the consumers.126 For any one licensing 
law, the amount by which prices are inflated is too small for 
consumers to notice. This naturally leads to rational igno-
rance—i.e., the problem is too small for citizens to care about 
fixing it—which then hampers reform efforts.127 In the aggre-
 
that judicial intervention is most justified when a law harming a minority 
group will not be subject to democratic reform. United States v. Carolene Prod. 
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice against discrete and insular 
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the op-
eration of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect mi-
norities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial 
inquiry.”); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 75–77, 151–53 
(1980) (building the Carolene Products footnote four into a theory of judicial 
review). 
 125. See Alexandra L. Klein, The Freedom To Pursue a Common Calling: 
Applying Intermediate Scrutiny to Occupational Licensing Statutes, 73 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 411, 435–38 (2016) (claiming that the individuals harmed by 
licensing laws are politically powerless); Austin Raynor, Note, Economic Liber-
ty and the Second-Order Rational Basis Test, 99 VA. L. REV. 1065 (2013) 
(same). 
 126. Kleiner, supra note 23 (estimating the amount of deadweight losses 
passed on to consumers by occupational licensing laws). 
 127. Because the negative effects of any particular license only have a 
small impact on consumers, citizens are “rationally ignorant” about this form 
of overregulation. Cf. Ilya Somin, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, 
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gate, however, licensing laws increase the price of goods and 
services between three and sixteen percent, amounting to an 
overall $ 200 billion yearly transfer from consumers to licensed 
workers.128 To put that figure in perspective, for the fiscal year 
2015 the federal government spent $ 102 billion on education 
and $ 85 billion on transportation.129 This is not to say that oc-
cupational licensing laws are as salient an issue as federal edu-
cation spending, but rather that hundreds of billions of dollars 
per year is a sufficient amount over which to fight. Based on 
their aggregate effects, licensing laws have the potential to 
reach a level of political salience that laws motivated by ani-
mus cannot normally achieve.130 
Economic protectionism is also more susceptible to political 
reform in a second way: lawmakers enacting licensing require-
ments are acting out of rational self-interest rather than irra-
tional prejudice. Indeed, public choice theory predicts the very 
existence of overly restrictive licensing laws.131 Professionals 
form associations, pool resources, and lobby their local legisla-
tors.132 For the legislator, it is a good deal. They create barriers 
to entry that help the association—receiving, of course, political 
support—while the costs passed onto consumers are too small 
to be noticed.133 It is predictable and rational for politicians to 
support these laws, provided their efforts go unnoticed.134 Alt-
hough the same conditions that lead to overregulation make 
deregulation difficult, the fact that legislators act out of ration-
al self-interest suggests that they may be convinced to change 
their minds, assuming, of course, that the political winds shift. 
 
CATO UNBOUND (Oct. 11, 2013), https://www.cato-unbound.org/2013/10/11/ilya 
-somin/democracy-political-ignorance (discussing rational ignorance). 
 128. See Kleiner, supra note 23. 
 129. Federal Spending: Where Does the Money Go, NAT’L PRIORITIES PRO-
JECT, https://www.nationalpriorities.org/budget-basics/federal-budget-101/ 
spending (last visited Mar. 17, 2017). 
 130. One might point to the gay rights movement as undercutting this 
point, but twenty years of advocacy never led to the legislative repeal of 
DOMA. 
 131. See generally Brief of Professor Todd J. Zywicki as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Plaintiff-Appellant, Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 
281 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1381), 2014 WL 4795938 (providing background on 
public choice economics and arguing that occupational licensing is a classic 
example of rent-seeking behavior). 
 132. Id.; see also McMichael, supra note 88 (describing how this process 
enables doctors to change the functions performed by nurse practitioners). 
 133. See WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 14. 
 134. See supra note 127. 
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There is some empirical evidence that increased public aware-
ness of an issue may dampen the effects of lobbying efforts.135 If 
that is correct, then the longer occupational licensing reform 
remains an issue of national significance, the better chance 
that reform efforts will succeed in the future. And the desirabil-
ity of a solution through the political process weighs against 
aggressive judicial review. 
In the traditional rational basis with bite cases, lawmak-
ers, acting out of animus, were not driven by the same rational 
self-interest that leads to economic protectionism, but instead 
by prejudice towards the cognitively disabled, homosexuals, 
and even hippies. Indeed, it is the very type of animosity giving 
rise to “the classification [that] blocks any self-correction.”136 
This is either because legislators “do not see a problem in the 
classification, or perhaps regard its animus-based vices as vir-
tues.”137 In a comparative sense, the difference between needing 
to convince legislators to reverse course and act in the general 
public interest should be easier than asking them to treat a his-
torically or currently disfavored group with equal regard.138 The 
litigants in the animus cases fought uphill against irrational 
 
 135. See Nathan Grasse & Brianne Heidbreder, The Influence of Lobbying 
Activity in State Legislatures: Evidence from Wisconsin, 36 LEG. STUDIES Q. 
567, 579 (2011) (finding that the increased salience of an issue decreases the 
effectiveness of lobbying efforts). Partisan support in Congress and increased 
media attention have already led to increased political salience. See, e.g., Edi-
torial: A License To Braid Hair? Come On, DES MOINES REG. (Jan. 19, 2016), 
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/editorials/2016/01/19/ 
editorial-license-braid-hair-come/78901608; Roll Back Regulation, Break Bar-
riers to Economic Mobility, PIONEER PRESS (Jan. 4, 2016), http://www 
.twincities.com/2016/01/04/roll-back-regulation-break-barriers-to-economic 
-mobility; Cass R. Sunstein, Business as Usual in D.C.? Not in the Age of Low 
Growth, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.bloombergview.com/ 
articles/2016-01-27/business-as-usual-in-d-c-not-in-the-age-of-low-growth; 
Josh Zumbrun, Occupational Licenses May Be Bad for the Economy, But Good 
for Workers Who Have Them, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 18, 2016), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
economics/2016/04/18/occupational-licenses-may-be-bad-for-the-economy-but 
-good-for-workers-who-have-them; see also Hillary Clinton Will Make Life Eas-
ier for Small Business at Every Step of the Way, HILLARY FOR AM., https:// 
www.hillaryclinton.com/briefing/factsheets/2016/08/23/hillary-clinton-will 
-make-life-easier-for-small-business-at-every-step-of-the-way (last visited Mar. 
17, 2017) (discussing occupational licensing reform as part of Hillary Clinton’s 
campaign agenda). 
 136. Carpenter, supra note 56, at 222. 
 137. Id. 
 138. The White House Report on licensing reform lays out many reasons 
why it is in the public interest to reform such laws. See generally WHITE 
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17. 
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prejudice and perhaps that justifies heightened judicial inter-
vention. 
III.  WHY COURTS SHOULD NOT EXTEND HEIGHTENED 
SCRUTINY TO LAWS MOTIVATED BY ECONOMIC 
PROTECTIONISM   
If Supreme Court precedent does not justify striking down 
occupational licensing laws under the rational basis with bite 
standard, then this Part goes a step further, arguing that 
courts should not extend heightened judicial review to include 
occupational licensing laws motivated by economic protection-
ism. It does so by proceeding in three Sections. The first Section 
explains that courts should not adopt an aggressive anti-
economic protectionism principle based on the degree of diffi-
culty in detecting such a purpose. As past cases comprising the 
circuit split on this issue demonstrate, judges do not have a re-
liable set of factors available for detecting such a motivation. 
They have instead relied on a lack of fit between licensing re-
quirements and the public regarding values they purport to 
serve.139 This is a trend likely to continue into the future as oth-
er indicia of legislative intent are either unavailable or unrelia-
ble in occupational licensing cases. The second Section follows a 
strong anti-economic protectionism principle to its logical con-
clusion, pointing out that much contemporary legislation and 
regulation would come under heightened judicial scrutiny, were 
courts to take such a principle seriously. Finally, the third Sec-
tion suggests that aggressively policing economic protectionism 
under the Fourteenth Amendment is at least partially unneces-
sary as plaintiffs have other legal claims available. Indeed, re-
jecting heightened judicial review carries the benefit of direct-
ing occupational licensing challenges towards those other 
claims that have often been ignored as interest groups push an 
economic liberties agenda in federal court.140 This Part will un-
pack these arguments against extending heightened review to 
laws motivated by economic protectionism in turn. 
 
 139. See infra Part III.A. 
 140. See infra Part III.C. 
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A. INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCY AND ECONOMIC 
PROTECTIONISM 
Federal courts lack the institutional competency to adopt a 
strong anti-economic protectionism principle, or at least one 
that could be consistently applied with some measure of pre-
dictability. Under traditional Fourteenth Amendment jurispru-
dence, courts use factors related to the legislative process for 
ferreting out illegitimate purposes.141 Building on those cases, 
scholars have called for using those same factors to detect eco-
nomic protectionism.142 This Section works through several of 
these possibilities, explaining why they are not reliable indica-
tors of economic protectionism. 
The unreliability of traditional purpose scrutiny factors in 
economic protectionism cases causes another problem—one 
that has already arisen in several occupational licensing cases. 
Left without other indicia of economic protectionism, courts 
must fall back on means-ends scrutiny as a way of detecting 
illegitimate motivation.143 This blending of purpose and means-
end scrutiny always carries an unintended consequence of im-
plicitly applying intermediate scrutiny to occupational licensing 
challenges. This Section first attacks several possible indicators 
of economic protectionism as either unreliable or unavailable 
and then explains why detecting purpose through means-end 
analysis necessarily leads to intermediate scrutiny. 
Traditional indicia of legislative purpose, set forth by the 
Supreme Court in Arlington Heights, are largely ineffective 
when searching for economic protectionism.144 The courts of ap-
peal that struck down occupational licensing laws did not rely 
on legislative history—the most natural source of legislative 
intent—in ascribing protectionist motives to the challenged 
regulations.145 This trend of determining intent without legisla-
tive history will likely continue into the future. States do not 
produce the same volume of legislative history as their federal 
 
 141. See supra notes 63–65. 
 142. See Menashi & Ginsburg, supra note 79, at 1098 (laying out the fac-
tors). 
 143. See St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 223–27 (5th Cir. 2013); 
Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 990–92 (9th Cir. 2008); Craigmiles v. 
Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 225–29 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 144. See supra notes 60–62. 
 145. See generally St. Joseph Abbey, 712 F.3d 215; Merrifield, 547 F.3d 978; 
Craigmiles, 312 F.3d 220. 
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counterparts.146 And even where such history exists, it is un-
likely that representatives will publically document a desire to 
push legislation out of economic protectionism. For legislative 
history to be useful in economic protectionism cases, legislators 
will need to fail, as Justice Scalia put it, “the stupid staffer 
test.”147 
Judges Douglas H. Ginsburg and Steven Menashi have 
suggested that courts might use two other Arlington Heights 
factors for detecting economic protectionism, such as “the evo-
lution of the legislation through a series of amendments, and 
the structure of the resulting law.”148 To be sure, these factors 
work well when a profession seeks to expand the range of activ-
ities covered by its licensing law as a means of restricting com-
petition, i.e., funeral home directors seeking an amendment to 
their governing licensing to prevent others from selling funeral 
merchandise.149 When a legislature amends licensing require-
ments with the clear effect of restricting competition for the 
benefit of a group but providing no special value it smacks of 
protectionism. Those same expansive amendments also result 
in a legislative structure that indicates bad intent. When a law 
effectively combines two professions, the party squeezed out of 
business will often be able to show how the new licensing re-
quirements demand more training than is required for their 
profession. For example, those selling funeral merchandise 
could point out all of the funeral home director educational re-
quirements that do not concern selling goods. 
Although the structure of legislation and the existence of 
amendments may reveal economic protectionism in some cases, 
these factors are ultimately of limited import. In cases where 
one profession uses legislation to squeeze out another, they will 
be helpful.150 Yet there are thousands of occupational licensing 
 
 146. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common 
Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 29 (1995) 
(“Yet another crucial distinction between state courts and federal courts inter-
preting statutes is the quantity of the legislative history that is available.”). 
 147. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025–26 n.12 (1992) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that if “the test . . . is whether the legislature 
has recited a harm-preventing justification for its action,” then “this amounts 
to a test of whether the legislature has a stupid staff ”). 
 148. Menashi & Ginsburg, supra note 79, at 1098. 
 149. See, e.g., Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 222 (using an amendment to a defi-
nition of a profession as evidence of economic protectionism). 
 150. Menashi & Ginsburg, supra note 79, at 1098. 
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laws nationwide, and many of them likely do not result from 
heavy-handed amendments. When an occupational licensing 
law serves only as a general barrier to entry and not as a direct 
means of attacking competition, the amendment and structural 
factors do not carry any weight. In such cases, amendments do 
not carry the same weight or do not exist, and the structural 
argument looks more like traditional means-ends scrutiny be-
cause rather than comparing two professions, the analysis 
would center on the burdens imposed by licensing requirement 
relative to the public interest served. 
Moving beyond factors related to the legislative process, 
courts may instead look to whether the burdens imposed by a 
licensing law can be justified in light of the public interests 
served by such regulations. In other words: is the cost to eco-
nomic liberty at least rationally related to the benefits enjoyed 
by the greater public? The problem with this approach, howev-
er, is that it necessarily demands at least rough quantification 
of the benefits and burdens imposed by licensing laws, which is 
not easily accomplished. 
For starters, defining the public-regarding values that 
might justify occupational licensing laws is difficult. Courts 
could opt for a narrow definition which might only include val-
ues like increased quality of service or a reduction in safety 
problems.151 These are not the only possibilities given that re-
strictive licensing laws could lead to increased financial in-
vestment by businesses or increased policing of consumer com-
plaints by licensing boards.152 Economic liberty proponents are 
unlikely to be satisfied by any definition that includes consum-
er complaints or financial investments as there are other, more 
direct means of achieving those benefits through consumer pro-
tection statutes or tax relief.153 
Even if courts could agree on the proper range of public 
values that licensing laws could legitimately serve, then there 
would still be an unresolved empirical question about how 
much particular professions serve such values. Answering this 
 
 151. See ADAM B. SUMMERS, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: RANKING THE 
STATES AND EXPLORING ALTERNATIVES 36 (2007), http://reason.org/files/ 
762c8fe96431b6fa5e27ca64eaa1818b.pdf; see also St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 
712 F.3d 215, 223–25 (5th Cir. 2013) (rejecting consumer protection as a valid 
justification for licensing a profession where other consumer protection stat-
utes exist). 
 152. Kleiner, supra note 23, at 4. 
 153. See SUMMERS, supra note 151, at 36–37. 
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question proves elusive. Consider two commonly licensed pro-
fessions, dentists and teachers, for which most people could 
raise non-protectionist based reasons for licensing. Even for 
these professions, empirical studies about the effects of licen-
sure on performance are a mixed bag with some showing that 
higher requirements do not lead to improved student or patient 
outcomes.154 If not even teachers and dentists can back up their 
licensing requirements with strong empirical data, then it’s 
likely that most others cannot either. 
Compared with determining the public value served by a 
particular license, the burdens imposed by licensing require-
ments can be more easily measured. Occupational licensing 
statutes often require some combination of easily quantifiable 
factors like schooling, exams, and fees.155 The trouble comes 
from how one defines burdensome. For instance, doctors must 
undergo extensive training but receive substantial compensa-
tion. In an absolute sense, licensing requirements for that pro-
fession are burdensome but perhaps justified based on financial 
incentives. Ultimately, the relative burden of licensing re-
quirements turns not only on the requirements imposed but 
also on the value provided to the public and to the licensed par-
ty. As previously discussed, the problem ultimately rests on the 
difficulty in determining which values properly serve the public 
and how such values should be measured. Without solving the 
public-regarding values problem, describing a licensing regime 
in terms of burdens imposed is not helpful. 
One way of avoiding the difficulties associated with quanti-
fying the benefits and burdens of occupational licensing re-
gimes is to use a comparative approach that considers the re-
quirements of a challenged profession in comparison with the 
requirements of other similar professions within that state or 
the requirements imposed on the same profession in another 
state.156 The problem with comparative analysis arises from the 
substantial variation in how states license the same profes-
sions.157 For instance, the amount of education required to be-
 
 154. See WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 58 (collecting studies). 
 155. CARPENTER II ET AL., supra note 119, at 13 (providing a summary of 
farm laborer contract licensing requirements). 
 156. This type of proportionality analysis in constitutional cases is popular 
in Europe. See generally G. Brinton Lucas, Structural Exceptionalism and 
Comparative Constitutional Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 1965 (2010) (describing con-
stitutional analysis based on proportionality principles). 
 157. See, e.g., Menashi & Ginsburg, supra note 79, at 1098. 
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come an EMT varies from zero to over 140 days, with twenty 
unique variations in between.158 To provide another example, 
preschool teachers must undergo between 365 and 1825 days of 
training, with four distinct variations between.159 The Institute 
for Justice’s License To Work study reveals similar variations 
among most licensed professions.160 As a result, comparing pro-
fessional requirements across state lines does not provide an 
objective basis for separating the degrees of licensing burden 
imposed by various statutory schemes. In many instances, 
courts would just be replacing a standardless inquiry into bur-
dens with a standardless comparison between different state 
licensing regimes. To avoid this subjectivity, courts would need 
to compare a particular licensing regime to the state with the 
least restrictive licensing regime. But such an analysis would 
transform an anti-economic protectionism principle into a con-
stitutional mandate for uniform licensing requirements. That 
cannot be right. 
These differences across state lines extend beyond how pro-
fessions are licensed to which professions are licensed, and thus 
courts cannot use the number of states licensing a profession as 
a strong indicator of protectionism. There are 1100 licensed oc-
cupations nationwide, but only sixty professions require licen-
sure in every state.161 According to a White House report filed in 
the summer of 2016, the variation in professions licensed is a 
matter of state policy and not a matter of professions existing 
in some states rather than others.162 Looking to the data pro-
vided by the License To Work report reveals the scattershot na-
ture of occupational licensing requirements. The data from that 
study shows no correlation between the requirements for licen-
sure and the number of states licensing any particular profes-
sion.163 In other words, the professions with the most training 
 
 158. Emergency Medical Technician, INST. FOR JUST. (Apr. 24, 2012), http:// 
ij.org/report/license-to-work/ltw-occupation/?id=26. 
 159. Preschool Teachers, INST. FOR JUST. (Apr. 24, 2012), http://ij.org/ 
report/license-to-work/ltw-occupation/?id=69. 
 160. See generally CARPENTER II ET AL., supra note 119. 
 161. See WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 4. 
 162. See id. 
 163. This observation is based on a linear regression of the data provided 
on the Institute for Justice website. Such a regression procures a correlation 
coefficient of less than 0.10. Other regressions similarly reveal no correlation 
between frequency of licensure and licensing requirements. See Table 4: 
Breadth and Burden of Licensure: Occupations Ranked by Number and Aver-
age Burden of Licensed States Combined, INST. FOR JUST. (Apr. 2012), http://ij 
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required, which should, in theory, provide the most public bene-
fit, are not more likely to be licensed in a higher number of 
states. 
Left without a solid empirical basis for making determina-
tions about benefits and burdens of licensing requirements or 
without traditional indicia of legislative intent, courts are left 
in the position of using means-ends analysis for finding eco-
nomic protectionism—an approach silently used by the Fifth, 
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits.164 
Otherwise stated, courts might look at how well a legisla-
ture tailored a licensing regime in pursuit of a public health, 
safety, and welfare goal. Under such an approach, poorly tai-
lored requirements would serve as an indicator of economic 
protectionism, but this also leads to unintended consequences. 
Collapsing purpose scrutiny with a means-end determina-
tion, if widely adopted, would result in elevating occupational 
licensing challenges to heightened judicial scrutiny.165 This im-
plicit jump to intermediate scrutiny follows logically. Suppose 
that courts were to presume economic protectionism motivates 
laws that fail a means-ends standard equal to or less demand-
ing than traditional rational basis review.166 Under those cir-
cumstances, an anti-economic protectionism principle does not 
guard economic liberties any more than current constitutional 
law. For such a principle to provide protection against overly 
restrictive licensing laws, the means-ends inquiry used to 
smoke out economic protectionism must be greater than the 
rational basis standard, which necessarily implies a level of 
heightened judicial scrutiny.167 
 
.org/report/license-to-work/tables/table-4-breadth-and-burden-of-licensure 
-occupations-ranked-by-number-and-average-burden-of-licensed-states 
-combined. 
 164. See St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 223–28 (5th Cir. 2013); 
Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 990–92 (9th Cir. 2008); Craigmiles v. 
Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 225–29 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 165. This would be the preferred result of some commentators. See, e.g., 
Will Clark, Comment, Intermediate Scrutiny as a Solution to Economic Protec-
tionism in Occupational Licensing, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 345 (2016); Harfoush, 
supra note 79 (arguing against protectionist occupational licensing); Klein, 
supra note 125 (same); Sandefur, supra note 79 (arguing for heightened pro-
tection of economic liberties). 
 166. The past circuit court cases relied almost exclusively on a lack of 
means-ends fit. See St. Joseph Abbey, 712 F.3d at 223–28; Merrifield, 547 F.3d 
at 990–92; Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 225–29. 
 167. This assumes that courts do not have other tools besides means-ends 
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As it stands, courts lack the tools to determine when a leg-
islature passes occupational licensing requirements based pri-
marily on economic protectionism. The unavailability of tradi-
tional purpose scrutiny tools and the implicit jump to height-
ened scrutiny that comes with a search for economic protection-
ism should give courts pause before adopting such a principle. 
The idea that a legislative act should be subject to presump-
tively heightened judicial review under the Fourteenth 
Amendment without a showing of improper purpose would be 
foreign to constitutional law and would create a bizarre world 
in which economic liberties would receive automatic heightened 
review while those alleging as-applied race or sex discrimina-
tion would need to first show bad legislative intent.168 
B. A SERIOUS ANTI-ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM PRINCIPLE 
CALLS INTO DOUBT MUCH STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATION 
Enforcing a strong anti-economic protectionism principle 
would call into question much government legislation and regu-
lation. Such a theory would rest on the idea that a state actor 
denies citizens equal protection of the law when it creates clas-
sifications based only on a desire to help a favored interest 
group and nothing more.169 Proponents of heightened judicial 
scrutiny suggest that courts should police this illicit motivation 
based on Carolene Products grounds as well, arguing that pub-
lic choice theory supports the futility of remedying protectionist 
legislation through the political process.170 Yet the same public 
choice principles that would support judicial review of licensing 
laws cannot be cabined to only those types of regulation. If 
heightened judicial review is really about bad motivation, then 
any regulation based on economic protectionism should be vul-
nerable—and that includes a lot of state action. 
 
scrutiny to use when ferreting out economic protectionism. See supra Part 
III.A. 
 168. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) (holding that 
as-applied race discrimination requires a showing of discriminatory purpose). 
 169. As the Court in Craigmiles stated: “[W]e invalidate only the General 
Assembly’s naked attempt to raise a fortress protecting the monopoly rents 
that funeral directors extract from consumers.” 312 F.3d at 229. 
 170. Neil Katsuyama, The Economics of Occupational Licensing: Applying 
Antitrust Economics To Distinguish Between Beneficial and Anticompetitive 
Professional Licenses, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 565, 565 (2010) (describing 
political process failure that entrenches licensing laws); see also Raynor, supra 
note 125, at 1085–86 (same). 
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To see why an economic protectionism principle would call 
into question much of modern state action, one needs only to 
look to the prevalence of lobbying in American society. Lobby-
ing is a three or four billion dollar-per-year industry.171 Corpo-
rations and trade associations represent more than eighty-five 
percent of those expenditures.172 Studies have shown lobbying 
can be successful, notably in areas like corporate taxes, tele-
communications prices, trade association entry barriers, and 
many others.173 Assuming that firms advocate in their own self-
interest and the public choice theory is correct, then there is 
simply a lot of economic protectionism at play in government 
today. Judge Posner once observed that “much governmental 
action is protectionist or anticompetitive” and that the Consti-
tution “does not outlaw the characteristic operations of demo-
cratic (perhaps of any) government, operations which are per-
meated by pressure from special interests.”174 So where is the 
limiting principle? 
The most natural stopping point for an anti-economic pro-
tectionism principle would be occupational licensing. Advocates 
of heightened judicial review might suggest that one’s interest 
in engaging in a lawful profession is more worthy of judicial 
protection than harms suffered as a result of economic protec-
tionism. True enough, citizens undoubtedly have a greater in-
terest in pursuing their lawful occupation than they do in 
avoiding artificially high telecommunications rates or paying 
the costs associated with trade association rent-seeking.175 But 
it is hard to see why that should matter. If an anti-economic 
protectionism principle is worried about legislative process, 
then it is only relevant that a legislature failed to consider the 
public good and acted instead to protect a faction.176 But polic-
ing all economic legislation and regulation for protectionist in-
tent is surely not an endeavor that courts wish to undertake. 
 
 171. John M. Figueiredo & Brian Kelleher Richter, Advancing the Empiri-
cal Research on Lobbying, 2014 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 163, 178 (2014). 
 172. Id. at 165. 
 173. Id. at 168. 
 174. Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 
1988). 
 175. See infra notes 171–73 and accompanying text. 
 176. Carpenter, supra note 56, at 231 (describing the rational basis with 
bite doctrine as “not concerned as much with the legislature’s substantive con-
clusion . . . as it is with the kinds of considerations (desire to harm the disad-
vantaged group) that materially influenced the outcome”). 
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On the other hand, if courts are not really worried about intent, 
then this ongoing conversation about economic protectionism 
should be about the appropriate standard of review for occupa-
tional licensing laws. 
The problems with an anti-economic protectionism princi-
ple raised by these last two Sections also suggests another un-
derlying difficulty: the push for heightened judicial review of 
economic protectionism is a stalking horse for reviving the pro-
tections afforded to economic liberties by the Supreme Court 
during the Lochner era.177 The lack of purpose scrutiny tools 
available to detect protectionism leaves courts to use means-
ends analysis. This type of analysis strongly resembles Lochner 
itself where the Supreme Court used inconsistencies in the 
challenged legislation to determine that the public health justi-
fications offered by New York were only pretext.178 What is 
more, if courts are not willing to extend an anti-economic pro-
tectionism principle to all legislation primarily motivated by 
special interests, then in a sense they will have fashioned a 
constitutional doctrine affording heightened scrutiny to a sub-
set of economic liberty claims that would have been protected 
during the Lochner era.179 There are compelling arguments in 
favor of ending the distinction between personal and economic 
liberties, but courts should face that issue head-on, rather than 
smuggling it under the guise of an anti-economic protectionism 
principle.180 
C. RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW ROUTES CHALLENGES INTO OTHER 
EXISTING DOCTRINAL AREAS 
There is an often overlooked benefit of denying a Four-
teenth Amendment solution to occupational licensing challeng-
es. By denying constitutional relief, courts provide a switching 
 
 177. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 178. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53–64 (1905), abrogated by W. 
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 179. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 626 (1887) (“[L]egislatures 
cannot, under the guise or pretext of a police regulation . . . strike down inno-
cent occupations and invade private property . . . .”). 
 180. There are legitimate and compelling originalist arguments in favor of 
applying heightened judicial review to occupational licensing challenges and to 
other efforts by state actors to impinge upon economic liberties. See generally 
Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, The Return of Lochner, 100 CORNELL L. 
REV. 527, 580–600 (2015) (providing a summary of originalist arguments in 
favor of Lochner). 
  
1736 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:1703 
 
function by pushing public interest groups into bringing chal-
lenges under alternative legal doctrines or in other courts. 
Among those other options, bringing suit under state constitu-
tional and administrative law or under the federal antitrust 
statutes are the most promising. As long as the federal judici-
ary continues to invalidate licensing laws on a semi-regular 
basis, interest groups will continue to expend resources at-
tempting to vindicate economic liberties under the Fourteenth 
Amendment—stunting the development of these alternative 
jurisprudential solutions. The goal of this Section is to briefly 
sketch several alternative paths to attacking overly restrictive 
licensing laws. Litigants should not believe that their only 
remedy lies in the Fourteenth Amendment; judges should not 
decide rational basis review cases as though they are the liti-
gant’s last hope. 
1. State Constitutional Law 
State constitutional law can be used to strike down occupa-
tional licensing laws. Although the United States Constitution 
provides a floor in terms of individual liberties, states are free 
to provide their citizens additional protections.181 This has been 
especially true for economic liberties. Over seventy years have 
passed since the Supreme Court last struck down a piece of 
economic legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment.182 
Meanwhile, state courts have done so over three hundred 
times, in over thirty different states.183 Not only are state courts 
 
 181. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival 
of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
535, 548 (1986) (“As is well known, federal preservation of civil liberties is a 
minimum, which the states may surpass so long as there is no clash with fed-
eral law.”). 
 182. See Phillips, supra note 16 (stating that the Supreme Court aban-
doned economic substantive due process in 1937). 
 183. See Anthony B. Sanders, The “New Judicial Federalism” Before Its 
Time: A Comprehensive Review of Economic Substantive Due Process Under 
State Constitutional Law Since 1940 and the Reasons for Its Recent Decline, 55 
AM. U. L. REV. 457, 512–39 (2005) (identifying the many instances that state 
courts have employed due process to strike down regulations but also noting 
the judicial retreat from substantive due process after Roe v. Wade); see also 
State v. Lupo, 984 So. 2d 395 (Ala. 2007) (striking down occupational licensing 
requirements for interior designers); Red River Constr. Co. v. City of Norman, 
624 P.2d 1064 (Okla. 1981) (striking down a regulation on truck specifications 
when they carry sand on a particular route); Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & 
Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. 2015) (striking down state regulations requir-
ing eyebrow threaders to be licensed cosmetologists). 
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open to these challenges, they are also much better suited to 
handle them.184 State courts can look to the licensing environ-
ment of their particular jurisdiction, gauge the openness of the 
political process to reform, and craft an appropriate standard of 
review.185 And states have recently invalidated licensing laws. 
In the past decade, several state courts have employed a 
more searching form of rational basis review to strike down oc-
cupational licensing laws. In 2003, the Supreme Court upheld 
an Iowa statute that taxed slot machines differently based on 
whether they were part of a casino or racetrack.186 On remand, 
the Iowa Supreme Court interpreted the Iowa Constitution as 
providing for more than a “toothless” standard of rational basis 
review—ultimately invalidating the statute.187 Similarly in 
2007, the Supreme Court of Alabama struck down an interior 
decorator licensing provision as unconstitutionally overbroad.188 
More recently, the Texas Supreme Court invalidated a regula-
tion that required hair threaders to become cosmetologists, and 
in doing so the Court interpreted its constitution to provide 
heightened protection of economic liberties.189 Texas courts now 
look to the real-world effects of statutes in determining wheth-
er there is a real rather than hypothetical rational basis.190 As 
one scholar put it: “More than in any other field, except per-
haps for review of local land use regulation, state courts in the 
post-Lochner era have utilized economic substantive due pro-
cess to protect the right to make a living.”191 Litigants should 
put that past precedent to use. 
 
 184. Jeffrey S. Sutton, Why Teach—and Why Study—State Constitutional 
Law, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 165, 173 (2009) (“Does anyone doubt that the 
Alaska Supreme Court might look at privacy issues differently from other 
States or for that matter the United States Supreme Court? Or that the Mon-
tana Supreme Court might look at property rights differently from other 
States or the United States Supreme Court?”). 
 185. Id. 
 186. See Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103 (2003). 
 187. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Iowa 2004). 
 188. See Lupo, 984 So. 2d at 404. 
 189. Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. 
2015) (striking down state regulations requiring eyebrow threaders to be li-
censed cosmetologists). 
 190. Id. at 87. 
 191. Sanders, supra note 183, at 484. 
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2. State Administrative Law 
State administrative law is a second possibility for chal-
lenging a limited subset of excessive licensing laws. This solu-
tion is of limited reach because many licensing requirements 
are statutorily defined, leaving agencies to serve only a 
straightforward enforcement function.192 When state agencies 
act with little discretion, there is not much regulatory activity 
to challenge. Yet, when state agencies issue regulations or de-
claratory rulings that expand the definition of one profession to 
cover another, administrative law becomes a viable option for 
judicial review. 
A recent example illustrates both the possibilities offered 
by state administrative law and how a potential Fourteenth 
Amendment solution leads to neglect of state law remedies. In 
Sensational Smiles v. Mullen, teeth whiteners—represented by 
the Institute for Justice—brought suit in federal court chal-
lenging a dentistry board declaratory ruling which mandated 
that only dentists may whiten teeth.193 The district court dis-
missed the suit on summary judgment, and the Second Circuit 
affirmed.194 Under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, 
adopted by Connecticut, declaratory rulings by agencies must 
be supported by “substantial evidence.”195 This standard is not 
particularly high but does require some documentable proof.196 
The teeth whiteners’ theory of the case rested on a total lack of 
evidence showing that LED lights posed a risk to public health. 
Indeed, the agency’s expert testimony contained no reference to 
the safety of such lights.197 Had the teeth whiteners demon-
 
 192. See, e.g., St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 223 (2013) (de-
scribing the licensure requirement as “built on the statute’s interlocking defi-
nitions of ‘funeral establishment’ and ‘funeral directing’”). 
 193. Martinez v. Mullen, 11 F. Supp. 3d 149, 150 (D. Conn. 2014), aff ’d sub 
nom. Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 116 (2016). 
 194. Martinez, 11 F. Supp. 3d at 169 (granting Connecticut’s summary 
judgment motion); Sensational Smiles, 793 F.3d at 288 (affirming on appeal). 
 195. See generally Samperi v. Inland Wetlands Agency of W. Haven, 628 
A.2d 1286, 1292 (Conn. 1993) (discussing the substantial evidence standard). 
 196. Cf. Lane v. Comm’r of Envtl. Prot., 43 A.3d 821, 828 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2012), aff ’d, 100 A.3d 384 (Conn. 2014) (describing the substantial evidence 
standard as deferential). But see AvalonBay Cmtys., Inc. v. Inland Wetlands & 
Watercourses Agency of Stratford, 23 A.3d 37, 48 (Conn. Ct. App. 2011) (over-
turning a declaratory ruling when the agency’s determination was not sup-
ported by any evidence). 
 197. Reply Brief of Appellant at 3 n.1, Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 
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strated this lack of evidence in state court, they would have 
stood an excellent chance of success. Instead, the Second Cir-
cuit dismissed their appeal in several paragraphs.198 To be sure, 
not every onerous licensing law comes into being through agen-
cy action. But when they do, administrative law provides a 
powerful attack on restricting licensing requirements. 
3. Federal Antitrust Law 
Finally, the Supreme Court’s decision in North Carolina 
State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission 
has opened up new and exciting possibilities for challenging 
licensing board activities.199 The Court’s decision requires states 
to actively supervise licensing boards when they are comprised 
of market participants.200 At least one significant challenge has 
already relied heavily on North Carolina State Board. In 
Teladoc, Inc. v. Texas Medical, plaintiffs sued the Texas Medi-
cal Board under the Sherman Act when the Board adopted a 
regulation prohibiting the diagnosis of medical conditions via 
video conference.201 The state of Texas did not raise antitrust 
immunity in the case.202 Judge Pittman did, however, grant a 
preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiffs based on anti-
trust law.203 Ultimately, the ability of antitrust law to curb 
overreaching licensing boards is not yet clear, but if Teledoc is 
any indication, it is off to a promising start. 
None of these alternative avenues of attacking occupation-
al licensing laws is a silver bullet. Some state constitutions pro-
tect economic liberty; others do not. State administrative and 
federal antitrust laws are similarly narrow. Between these 
three possibilities, however, a fair number of restrictive licens-
ing laws could be defeated. Both the difficulties in discerning 
economic protectionism and the existence of alternative solu-
 
793 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2015) (No.14-1381), 2014 WL 7335956, at *2 (“None of 
this out-of-court testimony speaks at all to the issues in this case. Indeed, in 
the more than 150 pages of documentation he attached to his report, there is 
only a single statement about LED lights.”). 
 198. Cf. AvalonBay Cmtys., Inc., 23 A.3d at 48 (overturning a declaratory 
ruling when the agency’s determination was not supported by any evidence). 
 199. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1107 (2015). 
 200. Id. at 1116–17. 
 201. Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., 112 F. Supp. 3d 529, 532 (W.D. Tex. 
2015). 
 202. Id. at 535. 
 203. Id. at 544. 
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tions counsel against adopting heightened review of illegiti-
mately motivated licensing laws. The final Part of this Note 
concludes by arguing that Congress needs to spur licensing re-
form efforts and lays out a plan describing how it might do so. 
IV.  REFORMING OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING LAWS 
WITHOUT FEDERAL JUDICIAL INTERVENTION: 
REVIVING THE INDIANA PLAN   
This Note argues throughout that existing Supreme Court 
precedent does not support federal courts striking down occu-
pational licensing laws and that heightened review should not 
be extended to reach such a result.204 Closing the doors to fed-
eral courts does not also foreclose the possibility of licensing 
reform. Congress can encourage states to take action. This Part 
proposes a grant program wherein Congress would fund state 
sunset laws to study and eliminate occupational licensing re-
quirements. First, Section A explains why federal intervention 
is necessary. Second, Section B introduces two current efforts 
at the national level and argues that neither will lead to signif-
icant changes. Third, Section C concludes by describing a grant 
program that would promote sunset commissions while leaving 
plenty of discretion to state governments. 
A. WHY FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IS NEEDED TO SOLVE THE 
OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING PROBLEM 
Congress should promote occupational reform not because 
federal intervention into state economic policy is desirable, but 
because it is the best of competing alternatives. States have 
had little success in solving this problem on their own;205 inter-
state travel has not spurred a race to the top.206 Nor is it desir-
able to charge judges with conducting the case-by-case cost-
benefit analysis required.207 A grant program that promotes re-
 
 204. See supra Parts II, III. 
 205. See generally The De-Licensing of Occupations in the United States, 
BUREAU LAB. STATS. (May 2015), http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2015/article/the 
-de-licensing-of-occupations-in-the-united-states.htm (summarizing reform 
efforts at the state level) [hereinafter De-Licensing of Occupations]. 
 206. There are two sources for this conclusion. First, licensing laws have 
not been reformed. See id. Second, most states maintain a similar level of 
overall licensure. See infra notes 216–17 and accompanying text. 
 207. This Note previously rejected such a possibility. See supra Part III. 
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form efforts, while leaving a wide berth for state innovation, is 
the best of competing alternatives. 
The states have created a mess of overly restrictive, incon-
sistent, and economically damaging licensing requirements.208 
Just as they have created the problem, state governments have 
failed to lead reform efforts. Indeed, only eight professions have 
ever had their licensing requirements removed.209 Over the past 
five years, several efforts to enact broad reform bills have died 
in state legislatures.210 States may be vulnerable to interest 
group capture, and for legislation involving occupational licens-
ing, interest groups have strong incentives to fight against re-
form.211 Making matters worse still, state governments collect 
substantial revenue from licensing fees, and thus deregulation 
can create short-term budget shortfalls.212 Whatever the main 
barriers to deregulation efforts that engender bi-partisan sup-
port might be, they have thus far blocked any meaningful re-
forms. 
Another possible solution would be to continue letting 
states compete for new entrepreneurs that arrive via interstate 
travel. As mentioned earlier, there is very little variation be-
tween states on practicing professions, but there is substantial 
variation in whether states license any particular profession.213 
Ilya Somin points out that forty-three percent of Americans 
have lived in two or more states, and that those with low in-
comes are twice as likely to move interstate.214 Further, eco-
nomic considerations are the most likely factor to motivate in-
terstate movers.215 Despite an environment that appears favor-
able to interstate migration putting pressure on legislatures to 
 
 208. See WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 4. 
 209. See De-Licensing of Occupations, supra note 205. 
 210. See id. (“[A] number of recent attempts have occurred at the state 
level—nine as of 2014—to de-license collectively certain groups of occupations 
. . . these attempts were unsuccessful.”). 
 211. Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1689, 1730 (1984) (stating that state legislatures may be particularly 
susceptible to capture when legislation affects wealth distribution). 
 212. See State Tax Collection Sources 2000–2013, TAX POL’Y CTR., http:// 
www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/state-tax-collection-sources-2000-2013 (last 
visited Mar. 17, 2017) (showing that states collect substantial revenues from 
occupational licensing). 
 213. See WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 4. 
 214. See ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY 
SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER 144 (2013). 
 215. See id. at 144–45. 
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deregulate, however, there is little difference in how many low-
income professions are licensed per state. According to the In-
stitute for Justice’s License To Work study, the average state 
licenses forty-three low-income professions, with a standard 
deviation of only ten.216 Indeed, rather than leading to deregu-
lation, the patchwork of licensing laws nationwide has given 
rise to a substantial increase in licensure over the past fifty 
years.217 
Judges—either state or federal—could be a third option for 
reforming licensing laws. This could come by way of legisla-
tures creating an occupational licensing cause of action that 
permits courts to apply intermediate scrutiny,218 or it could 
come via constitutional interpretation. This Note previously 
argued against the latter. But any cause of action requiring 
heightened scrutiny will also require both an economic estima-
tion (how much public value) and a corresponding policy de-
termination (how much regulation is appropriate).219 Judges 
have limited resources, clogged dockets, and most of them are 
not labor economists.220 All things being equal, it seems unob-
jectionable that it would be better for elected or appointed offi-
cials to conduct the required cost-benefit analysis. They are not 
limited to the record evidence presented by the parties and are 
politically accountable for the choices they make about the level 
of regulation that should be imposed. 
Finally, Congress could pass an aggressive program that 
federalizes occupational licensing requirements or that gives a 
federal agency the power to preempt licenses on a case-by-case 
basis. A law like this would easily survive a Commerce Clause 
challenge based on the overall economic effects of licensing 
 
 216. See CARPENTER II ET AL., supra note 119. But see WHITE HOUSE RE-
PORT, supra note 17, at 4 (claiming there is wide variation among the states). 
 217. See WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 3. 
 218. See, e.g., Allow Act, S. 3158, 114th Cong. (2016) (introducing such 
legislation). 
 219. For instance, the Allow Act would prohibit licenses placing “a substan-
tial burden on a person” unless “the government has an important interest” 
and “the regulation is substantially related to achievement of ” that interest. 
Id. § 207 (b)(1)–(2); see also Model Economic Liberty Law, INST. FOR JUST., 
http://ij.org/activism/legislation/model-legislation/model-economic-liberty-law-1 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2017). 
 220. See generally Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Striking a Devil’s Bargain: 
The Federal Courts and Expanding Caseloads in the Twenty-First Century, 13 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 473 (2009) (describing the “crushing caseloads” of the 
federal courts). 
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laws and their impact on interstate migration.221 But states 
have long managed their own licensing regimes. The Supreme 
Court observed in Dent v. State of West Virginia: “[I]t has been 
the practice of different States, from time immemorial, to exact 
in many pursuits a certain degree of skill and learning upon 
which the community may confidently rely. . . .”222 States have 
always maintained their own licensing laws. Any national solu-
tion should thus respect federalism to the greatest extent pos-
sible. This counsels against aggressive federal intervention. 
A grant problem avoids some of difficulties present in each 
of the alternatives rejected in this Section. A federal grant pro-
gram respects federalism by allowing states to decide whether 
to participate and by allowing states to fashion their own re-
form efforts. Any such program would require cost-benefit 
analysis to be conducted by democratically accountable public 
officials. And finally, a grant program can be designed to coun-
teract the political process failures at the state level that cur-
rently make reform impossible. Before turning to what such a 
federal program should look like, we will turn briefly to a dis-
cussion of why existing federal reform efforts are inadequate. 
B. THE CURRENT REFORM PROPOSALS IN CONGRESS AND THE 
WHITE HOUSE PLAN ARE BOTH INADEQUATE 
There are two main proposals in place for reforming occu-
pational licensing laws. The first is a program established by 
the Obama administration that gives independent groups mon-
ey to work with state legislatures.223 The second is a bill pro-
posed by Mike Lee and Ben Sasse that operates primarily by 
 
 221. If Congress can regulate homegrown marijuana for personal consump-
tion, the intrastate killing of wolves on private property, and a cat at the Ern-
est Hemmingway Museum, then licensing laws affecting the national economy 
by billions of dollars should be no problem. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 
(2005) (homegrown marijuana); 907 Whitehead St., Inc. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t 
of Agric., 701 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2012) (a cat at a museum); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 
214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000) (intrastate wolves). 
 222. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889). 
 223. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, White House, FACT SHEET: 
New Steps To Reduce Unnecessary Occupation Licenses that Are Limiting 
Worker Mobility and Reducing Wages (June 17, 2016), http:// 
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/17/fact-sheet-new 
-steps-reduce-unnecessary-occupation-licenses-are-limiting [hereinafter White 
House Fact Sheet]. 
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reforming licensure in the District of Columbia.224 Neither of 
these options show much promise. 
The White House program is unlikely to be effective be-
cause it targets the wrong part of occupational licensing re-
form. In its current form, the grant program gives funds to non-
profit organizations to work with state governments.225 But the 
problem over the past several years is not getting licensing re-
form bills to legislatures; it is getting legislatures to pass 
them.226 Indeed, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that col-
lective reform bills made it to committee in nine states over the 
past five years, yet each time the bill either died or was passed 
without removing licensing requirements.227 A program de-
signed to send more bills into the dysfunctional political process 
seems doomed to run up against the same resistance that de-
feated past reform efforts in the first place. 
Senator Mike Lee proposed the Allow Act in 2016.228 This 
legislation would institute licensing reform measures in the 
District of Columbia.229 It provides for increased state supervi-
sion of licensing board activities; creates a requirement that 
cost-benefit analysis be conducted on every licensing law every 
fifth year; and provides for a statutory cause of action, which 
imposes intermediate scrutiny on licensing requirements.230 
Lee’s proposal is unlikely to change licensing practices nation-
wide. Widespread consensus about the economic benefits of de-
regulation and potential competition for interstate migration 
have not led to reform.231 Why would reducing the licensing 
burden in the District be any different? 
Both of these reform efforts are unlikely to precipitate 
needed changes at the state level. They both fail to account for 
factors that defeated past efforts to reform licensing laws. To 
make a non-trivial difference, the federal government needs to 
increase its commitment to this issue. The next and final Sec-
tion of this Note proposes an alternative federal grant program. 
 
 224. Allow Act, S. 3158, 114th Cong. (2016). 
 225. See White House Fact Sheet, supra note 223 (announcing a grant of 
$7.5 million for states and organizations to work together to pursue licensing 
reform efforts). 
 226. See supra notes 205–06 and accompanying text. 
 227. See supra notes 205–06 and accompanying text. 
 228. See S. 3158. 
 229. See id. § 205. 
 230. See id. § 206. 
 231. See id. § 207. 
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C. LETTING THE SUN SET ON LICENSING LAWS BY TAKING THE 
FAILED INDIANA PLAN NATIONAL 
Congress should invest additional resources in occupation-
al licensing reform through a more aggressive grant program 
than the one currently in place. Congress should encourage 
states by providing monetary incentives substantial enough to 
defray the costs of setting up reform commissions and to offset 
the short-term licensing fee losses. Morris Kleiner suggests 
that because reform committees do not run heavy administra-
tive costs, take-up incentives for states would not need to ex-
ceed ten million dollars. He further notes that “every dollar 
spent on those incentives is likely to generate more than a dol-
lar in new economic activity: the plan will more than pay for 
itself.”232 But what should such a grant program look like? 
A failed effort in Indiana provides a model. In 2013, a bi-
partisan group of senators introduced S.B. 520.233 The bill cre-
ated an appropriately titled Eliminate, Reduce, and Streamline 
Employee Regulation (ERASER) Committee to analyze occupa-
tional licensing laws. A number of low-income professional li-
censes in Indiana would be reviewed through cost-benefit anal-
ysis on a five-year cycle.234 All licensing laws would automati-
cally expire during their designated year unless reauthorized 
by the state legislature.235 The bill put licenses for auctioneers, 
interior designers, and beauty culture on the chopping block; it 
passed the senate thirty-six to thirteen.236 After moving to the 
house of representatives, the bill died in committee—where it 
remains buried today.237 
Congress should use the failed ERASER Committee as a 
model for a grant program. Sunset legislation provides im-
portant benefits. First, by setting an expiration date on a par-
 
 232. Kleiner, supra note 22, at 19. 
 233. ERASER Committee, S.B. 520, 118th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 
2013). 
 234. Id. §§ 9–14 (putting a number of licenses on sunset). 
 235. See, e.g., id. § 10 (b) (“The licenses listed in this section are terminated 
July 1, 2014, unless the general assembly takes action in the 2014 legislative 
session to retain the licenses.”). 
 236. SB 520, OPEN STATES, http://openstates.org/in/bills/2013/SB520 (last 
visited Mar. 17, 2017). 
 237. Maureen Hayden & Scott Smith, Pence’s ‘ERASER’ Bill Appears Dead, 
HERALD BULL. (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.heraldbulletin.com/news/local_news/ 
pence-s-eraser-bill-appears-dead/article_f4143c37-d175-5fc9-86c9 
-d7e1733c0147.html. 
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ticular law, state legislatures force themselves to actually vote 
on reauthorization. By shifting the default rule from reauthori-
zation to deregulation, politicians lose the ability to kill legisla-
tion in committee.238 Second, by singling out each profession for 
an individual vote, sunset legislation stops interest groups from 
joining forces to defeat broader legislation.239 Third, periodic 
review of many licenses promotes fairness. Professions should 
not be reviewed for deregulation based on the clout of their re-
spective trade association. 
To put this ERASER grant proposal into place, a federal 
agency—perhaps the Department of Labor—should be charged 
with administering the program.240 Any such agency should 
conduct a study that recommends a set of professions that do 
not need licensing laws—identifying as well those professions 
where registration or certification would suffice.241 Subject to a 
minimum requirement, states should be able to choose the pro-
fessions to be put on sunset. States should also be able to pro-
pose the composition of their ERASER committees, subject to 
agency approval.242 Finally, commissions should be required to 
conduct cost-benefit analysis and make the results public. This 
requirement helps reform-minded legislators argue in favor of 
deregulation. But public cost-benefit analysis would also help 
state and even federal courts conduct informed judicial review 
in the future if necessary.243 
 
 238. Niki Kelly, Deregulation of Engineers Draws Fire, J. GAZETTE (July 
25, 2015), http://www.journalgazette.net/news/local/indiana/Deregulation-of 
-engineers-draws-fire-7899670 (quoting a state legislator as stating “due to the 
pressure from groups it’s very difficult to get anything done” and noting that 
he “took heat from the cosmetologists and barbers for being involved in the 
effort”). 
 239. States have delicensed a few professions when such efforts are under-
taken individually. See De-Licensing of Occupations, supra note 205 (noting 
eight professions have been deregulated). 
 240. The Department of Labor seems the natural choice because the White 
House charged it with administering the current program. White House Fact 
Sheet, supra note 223. 
 241. This should take some of the heat off of state legislatures when they 
are picking and choosing between professions to deregulate. For more infor-
mation on certification and registration, see Kleiner, supra note 22, at 22–23. 
 242. Indiana, for instance, proposed to use a mix of appointed officials, gov-
ernment actors, the Indiana University Dean of Public Affairs, and some li-
censed professionals. See ERASER Committee, S.B. 520, 118th Gen. Assem., 
Reg. Sess. §§ 7–8 (Ind. 2013). 
 243. Indeed, this fits nicely with this Note’s earlier suggestion of bringing 
more licensing claims in state court. See supra Part III.C.1. 
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Finally, the timing could not be more perfect for Congress 
to pass meaningful legislation addressing occupational licens-
ing reform. Both Democrats and Republicans support deregula-
tion.244 State governments are trying and failing to pass com-
prehensive deregulation measures.245 A grant program that 
promotes the Indiana model would be relatively inexpensive, 
easy to manage, and would force states to confront their most 
onerous licensing laws. 
CONCLUSION 
Occupational licensing laws enacted by state governments 
at the behest of special interest groups pose a serious problem 
in the United States. They are a drag on the economy. They 
push workers into unemployment and deny citizens their free-
dom to engage in their chosen profession. Three courts of ap-
peals have decided that economic protectionism cannot support 
state action. Rather than engage with the soundness of that 
determination, this Note asks a different question: If economic 
protectionism is illegitimate, then what role should such a 
principle play under the Fourteenth Amendment? 
Under Supreme Court precedent, a finding of economic 
protectionism cannot result in the invalidation of occupational 
licensing laws. The rational basis standard is simply too defer-
ential to support that result; nor is economic protectionism the 
kind of bad motive, like animus, that supports heightened judi-
cial review. This Note also argues that courts should not extend 
heightened review to laws motivated by economic protection-
ism. Such a principle would ask too much of the judiciary, en-
compass too much state action, and would stunt the develop-
ment of other doctrinal areas that can already provide a reme-
dy for restrictive occupational licensing laws. To be sure, com-
pelling arguments exist for increased judicial protection of eco-
nomic liberties, but a strong anti-economic protectionism prin-
ciple is both pragmatically and theoretically unsound. 
 
 244. Bi-partisan support exists at both the federal and state levels. See 
Steven Greenhut, California’s Bipartisan Push Against Occupational Licens-
ing, REASON (Feb. 22, 2016), http://reason.com/archives/2016/02/22/californias 
-bipartisan-push-against-occu; Ali Meyer, Bipartisan Support Builds for Occu-
pational Licensing Reform, WASH. FREE BEACON (Feb. 3, 2016), http:// 
freebeacon.com/issues/bipartisan-support-builds-for-occupational-licensing 
-reform. 
 245. See De-Licensing of Occupations, supra note 205. 
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This Note concludes that Congress is the correct branch of 
government to solve the nationwide occupational licensing 
problem. State governments have failed and continue to fail in 
deregulation efforts. A federal grant program that encourages 
the adoption of sunset commissions could spur deregulation at 
the state level, while at the same time maintaining respect for 
the historical role of state governments in licensing their citi-
zens. This would also take the pressure off of the federal judici-
ary. Democrats and Republicans agree on the importance of 
occupational licensing reform. Congress should transform that 
widespread agreement into meaningful legislation that breaks 
down unnecessary barriers to the American Dream. 
